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Abstract 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of explicit cognitions in relation to 
the development of obsessive smoking passion. Data derives from a longitudinal internet 
survey conducted among 939 daily smokers over a period of four months. Mental 
representations were the strongest predictor of obsessive smoking passion (ß=.47, p<.001) 
followed by habit strength (ß=.25, p<.001) and number of cigarettes smoked (ß=.09, p<.01). 
Altogether the variables accounted for 48% of the variance in obsessive smoking passion. 
The results indicated that mental representations, along with automatic processes, play an 
important role in the prediction of obsessive smoking passion. Theoretical and practical 
implications of the results are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
The psychological processes which are responsible for the development of an addiction 
to e.g. cigarette smoking and the processes which eventually lead to quitting addiction are 
clearly asymmetric as to the assumed role of cognition (Kovac & Rise, 2008). The quitting 
process is conceptually related to rational decision making and successful implementation 
of self-regulatory actions (e.g. Osch, Lechner, Reubsaet, Wigger, & de Vries, 2008). Thus 
the majority of social cognition models hold that goal-directed behaviours are the product 
of systematic and deliberative processing in the sense that successful goal accomplishment 
primarily depends on motivational stability, self-regulatory competencies and effort (see 
Conner & Norman, 2005).  
In contrast to the quitting process, the psychological mechanisms which sustain 
addictive behaviours are seldom associated with explicitly outlined cognitive functioning. 
Furthermore, the processes which underlie and facilitate execution of addictive behaviours 
are generally taken to occur outside the individual’s consciousness (McCusker, 2001). The 
psychological processes which are taken to be related to addictive behaviours are 
predominantly associated with automatic and habitual actions in terms of simple 
associative strengths (stimulus-stimulus), rewarding consequences (stimulus-response-
outcome), and habitual responses (automatic reactions) (see West, 2006 for a theoretical 
overview). In short, the dominant view in psychological theory holds that cognitions save 
people from doing the wrong things, e.g smoking, and more important, for the purposes of 
the present study, that explicit cognitions play a negligible part in development of 
addiction.  
The aim of the present study is to explore the role of explicit cognition and deliberative 
processes in relation to development of smoking addiction. For this purpose we use 
obsessive passion (OP) as an indicator of studying smoking addiction. Although the 
traditional conceptions of addiction and OP should not be confused (Philippe, Vallerand, & 
Lavigne, 2009) in terms of psychological states, they however may even be considered to 
be closely related in sense that the desire of involvement is not in the control of the agent 
(Vallerand et al., 2003). Explicit cognitions are presently defined as conscious thoughts 
which involve planning, anticipation, and self-awareness regarding future actions. These 
cognitions are usually easily encoded, maintained, and retrieved. The present theoretical 
approach is different from traditional conceptualisations which tend to portray smoking as 
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an automatic and habitual action which lack explicit cognition (Tiffany, 1990; Stephens & 
Marlatt, 1987; Baxter & Hinson, 2001). Our point of departure is that an addictive 
behavioural pattern might, with growing experience, increase in level of cognitive 
abstraction in the sense that people over time tend to plan their actions and identify specific 
behaviours in a more global manner (Wegner, Vallacher & Dizadji, 1989). For this reason 
we measure people’s explicit cognitions in relation to smoking which are presently called 
mental representations (MRs) (see Kovač & Rise, 2008 for more details), in addition to 
measures of past behaviour in terms of behavioural frequency (i.e. number of cigarettes 
smoked per day on an average) and habits (see Verplanken & Orbell, 2003 for more 
details). We hypothesize that MRs perpetuate smoking behaviour and, in addition to 
habitual and automatic responses, constitute the main process responsible for development 
of obsessive passion for smoking.  
 
      1.1 The theoretical background for MRs   
The theoretical rationale behind the development of the MRs construct has been 
thoroughly described elsewhere (Kovač & Rise, 2008) but may be summed up in terms of 
two postulates  
Firstly, there are important individual differences in how desired objects or activities, 
in this case smoking, are mentally represented. For instance, researchers within the delay 
of gratification paradigm have demonstrated that the manner in which individuals mentally 
represent rewards is more important for delaying gratification than the objective value of 
the rewards (Mischel, 1996). Mischel’s suggestion is that specific situations tend to 
activate characteristic patterns of interrelated mental units, i.e. people enter various 
situations and interact with the environment with various degrees of mental readiness. 
According to Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) the challenge for successful self-regulation 
rests on the ability to enter future situations with an altered set of mental representations 
which inhibit the activation of the “go” responses in relation to the desired object or 
activity.  
Secondly, there is a natural tendency for similar repetitive actions to gradually progress 
towards higher levels of cognitive abstraction. According to Action identification theory 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) every particular action can be identified at different cognitive 
levels. Higher cognitive levels are considered to be more abstract, consisting of 
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comprehensive ideas which aim to preserve the “why” aspects of action. Lower levels are 
more concrete, consisting of detailed descriptions of action and generally aim to preserve 
the “how” aspects of behaviour. The theory holds that there is a natural drive upward 
towards higher abstraction levels. For instance, if a person smokes extensively over a long 
period of time there is a definite possibility that the act of smoking will be transformed into 
stable mental representations of smoking. Wegner and co-workers (Wegner et al., 1989) 
suggest “that mental representations accompany all action, serve to instigate the action in a 
particular direction, and are used as points of reference for the continued maintenance of 
the action” (pp. 198).  
Building and synthesising on these ideas we propose that obsessive smoking is 
predominantly based on explicit and deliberative cognitions which we presently call 
mental representations (MRs). For the purpose of clarity we define MRs as dynamic 
cognitions associated with past experiences which evolve and grow in strength over time in 
contact with the desired object or activity.  
  
      1.2 The model 
In the present model we specify the temporal sequence of events which may lead to 
obsessive passion for smoking in terms of 3 distinct steps.  
The first step refers to repetitive contact with the behaviour or frequency of 
behavioural engagement as measured by number of cigarettes smoked per day. One aspect 
of daily cigarette smoking is that this activity produces repetitive physical movements such 
as lighting a cigarette, inhaling, and other physiological and psychological effects which 
are active as long as the stimulus (the cigarette), which produces them is present. However, 
the mere frequency of behavioural execution is relatively free from higher cognitive 
processes. The second step refers to behavioural routinization in terms of an explicit 
measure assessing the level of automaticity and habitualization (Verplanken & Orbell, 
2003). The idea is that the effects of relatively constant behavioural performances may lead 
to the establishment of habitual actions. As long as the situations are stable, behaviour is 
easy to perform, and motivation not to perform the behaviour is lacking, the execution of 
behaviour will proceed in an automatic manner. Thus, the measure of habitual behaviour 
captures people’s routines. However, similarly to step one, the behaviour is performed 
relatively free from deliberation and anticipation. Within the socio-cognitive paradigm, 
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including self-regulation theories, frequency of behavioural performance and habit are 
typically held responsible for the development of behaviours that are resistant to change, 
e.g., smoking and eating an unhealthy diet (Verplanken, Herbadi, Perry, & Silvera, 2005). 
However our model includes a third step, where behavioural frequency and habit is 
expected to jointly form explicit cognitions or MRs of smoking. The idea is that various 
behaviours, particularly those which are of a similar nature, over time increase in level of 
cognitive abstraction. The MRs of smoking, for instance, apart from being automatically 
evoked by stimuli and environmental cues, might over time also become a matter of 
deliberate processing. The measure of smoking MRs represents an explicit measure which 
assesses various aspects of a person’s cognitions in relation to involvement to smoking 
(Kovac & Rise, 2008). In this context an important distinction between habitual responses 
and MRs is the active role of conscious processes, e.g. in terms of premeditation in 
pursuing possibilities for smoking. Thus, we posit that habitual responses and simple 
automatic reactions in terms of behavioural frequency are mediated by MRs which 
represent a main process behind obsessive smoking. Finally, as a result of the three steps 
outlined above, smoking can eventually become an obsessive passion and indicator of 
(Vallerand et al., 2003). In this context we follow Orford (2001) which holds that addiction 
can be seen as a form of strong attachment which over time might become so excessive 
that it affects the quality of life and the level of control over the quitting process.  
 
      1.3 The present hypotheses 
We hypothesize that obsessive passion for smoking derives from MRs, in addition to 
habit strength and behavioural frequency. Thus, in contrast to the traditional view within 
the socio-cognitive framework, we argue that the latter process also has a definite 
cognitive, deliberative flavour.  More specifically, we hypothesize that the effect of 
behavioural frequency on obsessive smoking passion is mediated by the formation of 
habits. Finally, we hypothesize that the effect of frequency and habit on obsessive smoking 
passion is mediated by MRs of smoking, but that habit also contributes directly to 
obsessive smoking passion.   
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2. Method 
 
            2.1 Respondents and procedure 
            1439 daily smokers responded to an invitation to participate in the present study. 
The invitation was displayed on 15 national internet newspapers and was open for a period 
of 10 days. The participants were informed that their e-mail addresses would be deleted 
after the study was completed. Four months later, at Time 2 (T2), the follow up 
questionnaire was sent to the participants who completed the first questionnaire, and a total 
of 1024 (71.2%) responded. Eighty five participants were excluded from the final analysis 
due to systematic missing data. A total of 939 participants were included in the analysis. 
The mean age of the participants was 35.8 (SD 11.7) with a range from 15 to 74 years, and 
49 % of the participants were women. The participants reported smoking for 18.6 years on 
an average, with an average of 13.5 cigarettes per day.  To address the hypotheses 
regarding obsessive passion, only those who reported smoking at T2 (N=825) were 
included in the regression analysis. Fifty percent were women and the average age was 36 
years. The participants reported smoking for 19.0 years on average, with an average of 
13.8 cigarettes per day. A series of ANOVAs showed that there were no significant 
differences between the 415 participants who did not respond at T2 and the 1024 
participants who responded at T2 on the demographic and theoretical measures taken at 
T1.  
 
      2.2 Measures at T1 
The MRs scale (see table 1) is a uni-dimensional measure of explicit cognitions 
associated with smoking behaviour (for details see also Kovač & Rise, 2008). There are 
three distinct features of MRs. The first concerns the issue of anticipation and deliberation 
(items 1 and 2). In contrast to theoretical conceptualizations of habitual behaviour, actions 
which are high in MRs tend to occur with some degree of premeditation, i.e. although 
smoking is considered to be a fairly automatic and spontaneous behaviour, heavy smokers 
also tend to plan in advance when and where they have an opportunity to smoke. Second, 
the MRs of smoking are related to a number of micro-needs (item 3) i.e. well developed 
MRs might provide people with the sense that the act of smoking creates some of purpose 
and meaning in daily life. The third aspect of MRs assesses strength and importance of 
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cognitions which are related to smoking behaviour (items 4 and 5). We argue that these 3 
aspects (anticipation, “need” satisfaction, and strength of cognitions) collectively represent 
the main qualities of the MRs construct. The items were rated on a 7-point response scale 
ranging from (1) fully disagree to (7) fully agree. A descriptive analysis revealed that the 
mean score of the scale was 4.1 indicating that there was no ceiling or floor effects and the 
items had a reasonable normal distribution of responses. Principal component analysis 
(PCA) with varimax rotation identified only one dimension accounting for 56 % of the 
variance. All items loaded strongly on the extracted component (>.66). The internal 
consistency was satisfactory (Cronbach's alpha () =.80) and the “alpha if item deleted” 
option indicated that none of the items should be excluded. All item-item correlations were 
significant at p<.001 level with a mean score of .44. The corrected item-total correlations 
ranged from .50 to .69.  
 
Table 1. Mental representation scale 
1. If I am about to go somewhere, I often wonder whether or not I am allowed to 
smoke there 
2. I often plan my next cigarette 
3. For me smoking covers many minor needs during the day (work break, time to 
collect my thoughts, social needs, increase quality of life, etc.)                            
4. Smoking is more important to me than people around me are aware of 
5. Smoking is something which is strongly present in my thoughts 
Note. The rating scale ranged from 1 (fully disagree) to 7 (fully agree). There was no 
reverse scored items. 
 
Behavioural frequency was measured by number of cigarettes smoked per day in terms 
of the single question "How many cigarettes do you smoke each day, on an average" using 
the following categories 1-4 (1), 5-9 (2), 10-14 (3), 15-19 (4), 20-24 (5), 25-30 (6), 31+ 
(7). The response scale ranging from 1 to 7 was assumed to have interval level properties.  
 
Smoking habit was assessed by a 12-item self-report habit index (SRHI; Verplanken & 
Orbell, 2003). Three sample items are “Smoking is something I do automatically”, 
“Smoking is a daily routine to me”; “Smoking is something I would find hard not to do”. A 
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7-point response scale was used ranging from (1) completely agree to (7) completely 
disagree. A PCA confirmed the existence of one component and the responses were thus 
added into a sum-score to represent a measure of smoking habit strength ( = .90).  
 
          2.3 Measures at T2 
          Obsessive smoking passion was assessed by adapting the measure of obsessive 
passion deriving from the Passion Scale (Vallerand et al., 2003). Obsessive passion thus 
provides an explicit measure which assesses the strength of a person’s emotions in relation 
to smoking. The 4 items were: “I am emotionally dependent on smoking”; “My mood 
depends on me being able to smoke or not”; I have difficulty imagining my life without 
smoking; “I have difficulty controlling my urge to smoke”. The items were rated on a 7-
point response scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) ( = 
.85). The passion scale has previously been used to assess psychological mechanisms 
underlying various addictive activities, e.g., gambling behaviour (Mageau, Vallerand, 
Rousseau, Ratelle, & Provencher, 2005).  
 
3.0 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are provided in table 2. Note 
that only those who reported to smoke on a daily basis at T2 were included in the analysis 
(N=825).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations among the measures of smoking 
behaviour (N = 825). 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
     
1. Obsess. passion - .42 .57 .65 
2. Frequency  - .56 .41 
3. Habit    - .58 
4. MRs    - 
     
Mean 3.94 13.5 5.32 4.12 
SD 1.69. 7.44 1.22 1.46 
     
r > .10 p<.001 
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Obsessive passion correlated significantly with behavioural frequency in terms of number 
of cigarettes smoked per day, habit strength, and MRs. MRs correlated significantly with 
behavioural frequency, and habit strength.   
 
      3.1 Predicting obsessive passion  
In order to take care of the proposed temporal sequence model as outlined above, we 
performed a hierarchical regression analysis to predict obsessive smoking passion. The 
predictors were entered in three blocks: (i) behavioural frequency, (ii) habit strength, (iii) 
mental representations. The results are presented in table 3.  
 
Table 3. Hierarchical regressions of obsessive passion on behavioural frequency (step 1), 
Habit (step 2), and MRs (step 3) (N = 825). 
Step   Predictors 
entered                  
Beta                         
Beta                     
Beta 
     
1.                        Frequency   .42***                    
     
2. Frequency  .15***  
 Habit    .49***  
     
3. Frequency   .09** 
 Habit   .25*** 
 MRs   .47*** 
     
Adj. R2                  .18 .34 .48 
Fchange   193.48*** 219.21*** 
     
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
First, behavioural frequency accounted for 18% of the variance in obsessive passion. The 
addition of habit strength in the second step led to a significant increment (R2 change = 
.16, p<.001) in the amount of variance explained in obsessive passion reducing the size of 
the beta weight for behavioural frequency, from .42 to .15. This reduction of the beta 
weight was statistically significant, indicating mediation (Sobel test= 11.277, p<.001). In 
the final step, the addition of mental representations produced a significant increment (R2 
change = .14, p<.001) in the amount of variance explained in obsessive passion reducing 
the size of the beta weight for behavioural frequency from .15 to .09 and habit strength 
from .49 to .25, although both weights remained statistically significant at p<.001 level. 
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The reduction of the beta weight for habit was found to be statistically significant, 
indicating mediation (Sobel test= 12.139, p<.001). The final model accounted for 48% of 
the variance in obsessive passion with mental representations emerging as the strongest 
predictor, followed by habit strength and behavioural frequency. 
 
4.0 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to explore the idea that explicit cognitions in the form 
of MRs play a central role in the development of smoking passion, as an indicator of 
smoking addiction, beyond the traditional measures of past behaviour. Thus, the proposed 
theoretical model provided a good prediction of obsessive smoking passion (adj. R²=48%). 
Given the causal sequence of our model, the results suggest that the strength of MRs was 
the most important predictor of obsessive smoking passion by having the strongest direct 
effect as well as mediating about half the effect of habit strength. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that smoking passion received a sizeable direct influence from habit 
strength as well. These results indicate that MRs constitute potentially a useful measure of 
cognitions possessing a central role in the prediction of future obsessive smoking passion. 
Although the concept of MRs correlated strongly with behavioural frequency and habit, 
there was a clear unique variance supported by the regression analysis showing that MRs 
predicted smoking passion beyond the measures of automaticity. Furthermore, the finding 
that the effect of behavioural frequency was mediated by habit and MRs, and that the effect 
of habit was partially mediated by MRs indicates that the development of obsessive 
passion for smoking derives from two distinct processes. The first process refers to 
automatic and habitual processing (Bargh, 1996), which, as expected, exerted a significant 
direct effect on obsessive passion for smoking. This is consistent with the general view that 
addictive behaviours are connected to implicit cognition and learning mechanisms 
operating outside consciousness (McCusker, 2001). However, the role of MRs points to the 
novel idea that there exists a second route to the development of obsessive passion for 
smoking. This testifies that addictive behaviours are, in addition to being a result of 
automatic processes, also a result of conscious deliberation, at least in the context of 
smoking.  
The conceptualization of MRs might have a number of theoretical implications. First, 
to our knowledge, this is the first quantitative study which examines the role of explicit 
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cognition in the prediction of addictive behaviours. As noted earlier, an individual’s 
smoking history is commonly conceptualized and measured in terms of simple behavioural 
frequencies, e.g. number of cigarettes smoked per day (McMillan, Higgins, & Conner, 
2005). Consequently, smoking behaviour is seldom linked to explicit cognitions (i.e. self-
reports) beyond measures of frequency or automaticity (see Watters & Sayette, 2006). In 
contrast to traditional research practice, we posit that past actions which are associated 
with smoking directly involve explicit cognitions and can be assessed as such. Thus, most 
of the time people know what they are doing and choose their actions based on existing 
cognitive-emotional mind-sets and available information. This implies that repetitive 
actions are not necessarily stripped for cognitive processes as traditionally assumed in the 
psychological literature.  
Second, the important theoretical point is that MRs are conceptually distinct from 
deliberative and normative cognitions which are typical components in the majority of 
social cognition models. The core assumption of these models is that human behaviour, 
although containing automatic elements, is based on reason (Bamberg, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 
2003). The reasoned action processing path starts from higher abstraction levels which are 
expressed through normative and evaluative considerations and preferably ends up at lower 
cognitive levels, focusing on practical and achievable aspects of action. In other words, it 
is a top-down process which refers to a self-regulatory path on the continuum from 
desirability to feasibility or from cognitions to action (Gollwitzer, 1999). In contrast, the 
cognitions which form MRs represent a processing route which develops gradually from 
simple actions to congruent abstract cognitions. The formation of MRs, at least when it 
comes to repetitive behaviours, is a bottom-up process which starts from simple repetitive 
actions and develops to be a premeditated and yet automatically guided process. Thus, 
MRs, supported by habitual efficiency, represent a fairly stable process which over time 
might result in the development of excessive appetites and strong attachments.  
Third, the conceptualization of MRs might have a number of practical implications for 
the construction of suitable interventions regarding addictive behaviours. The present idea 
is that MRs represent a general mechanism for the development of addiction and that it 
provide an alternative account of why it is so difficult to stop addictive behaviours. Thus, 
the strength of MRs may account for the frequent fallbacks into previous behavioural 
patterns which are typical for addictive behaviours. From an intervention perspective, this 
 
Kovač, V. B., Rise, J., Moan, I. S. (2010). Premeditated automaticity: the role of explicit cognition in the 
development of obsessive smoking. International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 7:2. Available: 
http://www.insanbilimleri.com/en  
 
 
 
982
suggests that successful quitting partly depends on reconstruction and reformulation of 
one’s cognitive life associated with drug-seeking and drug-taking activities. Hence, the 
increased focus on reorganisation of explicit cognitions and mental representations in 
relation to addictive actions might improve the effects of tailored interventions aiming at 
preventing the activation of undesired responses. In short, in order to achieve long lasting 
behavioural changes, one has to reconstruct the manner in which the addictive substance is 
represented and encoded in tempting situations. At a societal level one also has to target 
the nature, strength and breadth of public symbols which facilitate growth of collective 
mental representations associated with the behaviour in question (Moscovici, 1981). That 
is, MRs constitute cognitions which are partially shared and, as such, can be targeted in 
traditional persuasive public health messages.  
 
There are a few limitations of the study which warrant consideration. First, the study 
relies on self-report measures which are frequently criticized in the contemporary literature 
on the grounds that this method threatens internal and external validity. For instance, the 
use of self-report measures to assess smoking passion might be problematic. However, the 
results of a meta-analysis of 185 studies applying the theory of planned behaviour 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001) showed that discrepancy between observed and self-reported 
behaviour, although present, is not substantial (R²=.20 and .31, respectively). Furthermore, 
a number of studies have successfully validated the self-report measures against more 
objective measures in the domain of smoking (Klesges, Klesges, & Cigrang, 1992; Patrick 
et al., 1994; Petitti, Friedman, & Kahn, 1981). Nevertheless, while it is difficult to obtain 
objective measures for constructs such as previous smoking history, it would be useful to 
collect more objective measures of smoking and smoking related habits. Second, future 
research would benefit from including additional measures of dependence in order to test 
the predictive value of MRs. And finally, although the MRs scale exhibit fairly good 
psychometric properties in terms of internal consistency, the quality of the scale could be 
improved on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Kovač & Rise, 2008).  
In sum, in the present paper we have explored the role of the cognitive processes in 
development of obsessive smoking passion. We challenged the traditional idea that the 
continuation of an addictive behaviour, like smoking, represents a pure automatic process 
which occurs outside the individual’s conscious attention and awareness, i.e. that addicts 
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do not know what they are doing. In terms of our model we were able to show that the road 
to obsessive smoking is more heavily paved with more explicit cognitions, denoted mental 
representations of smoking, than previously considered. This suggests that behavioural 
attachments confer meaning for the agents who perform the behaviour in question (e.g. 
smokers). In this context the challenge for future research is to address the self-regulatory 
issues concerning formation, resistance, and alteration of MRs.  
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